---
title: "JWT RFC 7519: JSON Web Token for identity and authorisation"
description: "JSON Web Token RFC 7519 (May 2015): IETF standard for signed/encrypted JSON authorisation tokens. Header, payload, signature. Used in OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0, stateless APIs, session alternatives."
url: "https://www.noze.it/en/insights/jwt-rfc-7519/"
lang: "en"
alternate: "https://www.noze.it/insights/jwt-rfc-7519/"
published: "2015-06-12"
author: "noze S.r.l."
keywords: "Open Source, Web, Cybersecurity, JWT, RFC 7519, JOSE, IETF, Token, Authentication, Security"
---

# JWT RFC 7519: JSON Web Token for identity and authorisation

JSON Web Token RFC 7519 (May 2015): IETF standard for signed/encrypted JSON authorisation tokens. Header, payload, signature. Used in OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0, stateless APIs, session alternatives.

12 June 2015

## The need for portable tokens

Modern web applications need a **stateless** mechanism to transport identity and claims: a user authenticates, the server issues a token that the client presents with every request; the API verifies the token without consulting the DB. It must be **signable**, **verifiable**, **compact**, **URL-safe**.

## The release

**RFC 7519** (JWT) is published by **IETF** in **May 2015**. Editors: **Michael B. Jones** (Microsoft), **John Bradley**, **Nat Sakimura**. Part of the **JOSE** family (JSON Object Signing and Encryption):

- **RFC 7515** — JWS (Web Signature)
- **RFC 7516** — JWE (Web Encryption)
- **RFC 7517** — JWK (Web Key)
- **RFC 7518** — JWA (Web Algorithms)
- **RFC 7519** — JWT

## Format

A JWT is a string composed of 3 base64url-encoded parts separated by dots:

```
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjMiLCJuYW1lIjoiQWRhIn0.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2...
↓ decoded
Header:    {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}
Payload:   {"sub":"123","name":"Ada","exp":1735689600}
Signature: HMAC-SHA256(base64url(header).base64url(payload), secret)
```

## Claims

- **Registered** — `iss` (issuer), `sub` (subject), `aud` (audience), `exp` (expiration), `nbf` (not before), `iat` (issued at), `jti` (unique id)
- **Custom** — any JSON field

## Algorithms

- **HS256/384/512** — symmetric HMAC
- **RS256/384/512** — asymmetric RSA (common in OIDC)
- **ES256/384/512** — ECDSA on elliptic curves
- **EdDSA** — Ed25519 (more modern)
- **PS256/384/512** — RSA-PSS
- **none** — historical vulnerability, **always reject**

## Common vulnerabilities

- **Alg confusion** — `none` acceptance, `RS256 → HS256` with public key as HMAC secret
- **Weak secrets** — HMAC with weak password
- **No expiration** — tokens valid forever
- **Sensitive payload** — signed but unencrypted JWT is readable; PII in payload dangerous
- **No revocation** — stateless = hard to revoke before expiration

## Typical usage

- **OpenID Connect** — `id_token` is a JWT
- **OAuth 2.0** — access tokens often JWT
- **Stateless APIs** — bearer token in `Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`
- **Federated SSO** — cross-domain assertions
- **Short-lived signed URLs**

## Best practices

- **Short** access tokens (5-15 min), longer refresh tokens
- **Asymmetric** signing (RS256/EdDSA) for microservices
- **JWKS rotation** — public keys published with `kid`
- Do not put **PII** in the payload
- **Reject `alg: none`** explicitly
- For web sessions, consider **opaque session cookies** (safer than JWT in localStorage)

## In the Italian context

JWT is foundation of:

- **SPID/CIE** — parts of flows
- **Digital PA APIs** — PagoPA, ANPR, INPS
- Italian **B2B SaaS** — REST API authentication
- **PSD2 Banking API** — stateless session state

---

_References: RFC 7519 (May 2015). IETF JOSE working group. Michael B. Jones, John Bradley, Nat Sakimura. Format header.payload.signature base64url. HS256, RS256, ES256, EdDSA algorithms. RFC 7515-7519 JOSE family._
